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A TRIBUTE TO RONALD COASE:   
A LEGEND MISUNDERSTOOD 
Philip L. Fraietta* 
 
Ronald Coase, the Nobel Prize–winning economist known for his 
founding contributions to the field of law and economics, passed away on 
September 2, 2013, at the age of 102.1  Coase is best known in the legal 
community for his 1960 Journal of Law and Economics article, The 
Problem of Social Cost,2 which ranked as the most-cited law review article 
of all time as of 2012.3  The article first articulated what fellow Nobel 
Prize–winning economist George Stigler would deem “The Coase 
Theorem.”4 
The Coase Theorem, as it is typically understood in the legal community, 
states that “if transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of a property 
right . . . will not affect the efficiency with which resources are allocated.”5  
This articulation of the Coase Theorem has been criticized by legal scholars 
as unrealistic because transaction costs are rarely ever low enough to allow 
for efficient bargaining,6 and because it does not account for psychological 
factors after the initial allocation of resources—specifically that people will 
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 1. Jacob Gershman, Ronald Coase, Author of ‘Most-Cited Law Review Article,’ Dead 
at 102, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/09/
03/ronald-coase-author-of-most-cited-law-review-article-dead-at-102/. 
 2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 3. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All 
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 tbl.I (2012) (showing The Problem of Social Cost as the 
most-cited law review article of all time). 
 4. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966) (“The Coase 
theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal.”); 
see also Deirdre McCloskey, Other Things Equal:  The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. 
ECON. J. 367, 367 (1998) (describing how Stigler coined the term “Coase theorem”). 
 5. Richard A. Posner, Nobel Laureate:  Ronald Coase and Methodology, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Fall 1993, at 195. 
 6. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1972) 
(discussing how the Coase Theorem is only a starting point since “no one makes an 
assumption of no transaction costs in practice”); see also Daniel Q. Posin, The Coase 
Theorem:  If Pigs Could Fly, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 89, 92 (1990) (noting that critics have 
raised issue with the transaction cost–free assumption). 
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always offer less to acquire something and demand more to sell it.7  Law 
and economics scholars of the “Chicago School,”8 by contrast, have 
defended the Theorem.9 
The unfortunate truth is that Ronald Coase is remembered in the legal 
community for something he did not believe.  As Coase has stated, “The 
world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world.  
Nothing could be further from the truth.  It is the world of modern 
economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to 
leave.”10  This is obvious to anybody familiar with Coase’s work, as his 
initial contribution to economics offered an explanation for why individuals 
choose to form partnerships, companies, and other business entities:  
because transaction costs are lowered by these institutional arrangements.11 
So who is the real Ronald Coase, and why did he write The Problem of 
Social Cost?  The real Ronald Coase was a man whose views on the nature 
of firms were influenced by the economic insights of Friedrich Hayek, 
Lionel Robbins, and Arnold Plant in their calculation-based criticism of 
socialism.12  He was also a man whose views on political economy were 
influenced by James M. Buchanan and public choice theory.13  So, contrary 
to popular perception, Ronald Coase was not a typical Chicago School 
 
 7. See Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:  A Critique, 
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981) (critiquing the Coase Theorem using the “offer-asking 
problem,” which observes that asking prices are normally higher than offer prices). 
 8. The term “Chicago School” generally refers to a school of thought in both 
economics and law and economics that adheres to neoclassical price theory and free market, 
efficiency-based solutions. See Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?:  
Competition Policy and the Role of Behavorial Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 
896–97 (2010).  The school attempts to analyze law through simplified and assumption-
filled economic models. See Mark Tushnet, “Everything Old Is New Again”:  Early 
Reflections on the “New Chicago School,” 1998 WIS. L. REV. 579, 586.  It has been given 
the name “Chicago School” because its proponents, including Milton Friedman, George J. 
Stigler, and Judge Richard Posner, are largely centered at the University of Chicago. See 
Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting Attitude Toward Concentrations of Business Power 
(1934–1962), 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527, 1527 n.1 (2011). 
 9. See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER:  WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH 
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 42 (2000) (“[T]he range of problems to which the Coasian 
solution is relevant may be much greater than many would at first guess.”); Posner, supra 
note 5, at 195 (citing the fact that “no-fault divorce does not appear to have increased the 
divorce rate” as empirical evidence of the Coase Theorem). 
 10. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988); see also 
McCloskey, supra note 4, at 368 (“Something like a dozen people in the world understand 
that the ‘Coase’ theorem is not the Coase theorem.”). 
 11. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  In 
fairness, Professor Daniel Posin, perhaps Coase’s most frequent legal critic, recognized this. 
See Posin, supra note 6, at 92 n.16 (stating that Coase himself recognized the deficiencies in 
a transaction cost–free model). 
 12. See Peter Boettke, Ronald Coase and Comparative Institutional Analysis, 
COORDINATION PROBLEM (Sept. 3, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://www.coordinationproblem.org/
2013/09/ronald-coase-and-comparative-institutional-analysis.html (discussing Coase’s 
formative intellectual background at the London School of Economics). 
 13. See id. (discussing parallels between Buchanan’s idea of political economy and 
Coase’s work). 
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economist.14  In fact, with The Problem of Social Cost, Coase was trying to 
change the views of the Chicago School, and modern economics as a 
whole, by showing Chicago and modern economists the absurdity of their 
transaction cost–free and institutionless models.15  His goal was ultimately 
to create a “genuine institutional economics” by enlisting the help of social 
scientists to uncover and examine real-world institutional designs.16  In the 
words of Coase himself: 
[W]e know that the costs of exchange depend on the institutions of a 
country—the legal system (property rights and their enforcement), the 
political system, the educational system, the culture.  These institutions in 
effect govern the performance of the economic system.  This is the basic 
reason why the New Institutional Economics is so important and why, if 
we are to achieve our objective, we have to enlist the help of lawyers, 
political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and other social 
scientists. . . .  The entry of economic analysis into the other social 
sciences has been termed economic imperialism.  We are engaged in a 
completely different enterprise—enlisting the help of those in the other 
social sciences to enable us to understand better how the economic system 
works.17 
With that, I say goodbye Ronald Coase, rest in peace, and may your vast 
contributions to the world of political economy one day be properly 
understood. 
 
 
 14. See id. (“While many younger readers will associate Coase with the University of 
Chicago and what they understand the field of Law and Economics to be, Ronald Coase 
didn’t join the staff at the University of Chicago Law School until 1964.”). 
 15. I do not mean to suggest that Coase’s affiliation with the University of Chicago Law 
School and Chicago School economists like Judge Richard Posner, George Stigler, and 
Milton Friedman should be forgotten.  I simply make the point that Coase’s analytical 
method was very “un-Chicago” in that he was highly critical of the use of—what he deemed 
unrealistic—mathematical models in economics. See COASE, supra note 10, at 185 (“In my 
youth it was said that what was too silly to be said may be sung.  In modern economics it 
may be put into mathematics.”). 
 16. See Boettke, supra note 12. 
 17. Ronald Coase, Speech to ISNIE:  The Task of the Society (Sept. 17, 1999), available 
at http://www.isnie.org/coase-isnie-speech.html. 
